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RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN NEW
YORK LAW
-Chapters 118 and 208 of the laws of 1999: The New York
Legislature develops a pseudo animal rights agenda
JENNIFER S. RosA*
In 1965, the New York State Legislature made torturing,
beating, mutilating, killing, or failing to feed animals a
misdemeanor offense.1  That statute, section 353 of the
Agriculture and Markets Law, had remained substantially
unchanged for almost 35 years.2 In the summer of 1999,
however, two bills concerning crimes against animals were
signed into law. Chapter 118 adds a subdivision to section 353
creating the felony of aggravated cruelty to animals, while
chapter 208 amends the Penal and Environmental Conservation
Law by banning canned shoots.3 Upon initial review, the bills,
signed within a week of each other, appear to signal a new
initiative for animal rights protection in New York. Yet, a more
thorough examination reveals that these new laws are clearly
not the beginning of a trend to criminalize mistreatment of
animals resulting from any increased sensitivity to animals'
rights.
The conduct prohibited by section 353 reads like a laundry
list of types of abuse: overdriving, overloading, torturing, or
cruelly beating; unjustifiably injuring, maiming, mutilating, or
* J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; BA., The
George Washington University.
1 See N.Y. AGRIC. & MXTS. LAW § 353 (McKinney 1991).
2 The section was amended in 1985, changing the mandatory fine from $500 to
$1,000. See id.
3 See 1999 N.Y. LAWS 118 (codified in N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a
(McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1999)); 1999 N.Y. LAWS 208 (codified in N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 11-1904 (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 1999)). For a definition of
canned shoots, see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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killing; denying, neglecting, or refusing to provide proper
sustenance; and the catch-all of willfully furthering, instigating
or engaging in any act of, or leading to cruelty.4 Exempted from
this rule is the use of animals for scientific tests, experiments or
investigations by state-approved laboratories or institutions,
which might otherwise be classified as cruelty.5 Other sections
of the Agriculture and Markets Law deal with different specific
types of abuses, such as the transportation or fighting
of animals.6
4 See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353 (McKinney 1991). The text of the statute
reads, in pertinent part:
A person who overdrives, overloads, tortures or cruelly beats or
unjustifiably injures, maims, mutilates or kills any animal.... or deprives
any animal of necessary sustenance, food or drink, or neglects or refuses to
furnish it such sustenance or drink, or causes, procures or permits any
animal to be overdriven, overloaded, tortured, cruelly beaten, or
unjustifiably injured, maimed, mutilated or killed, or to be deprived of
necessary food or drink, or who willfully sets on foot, instigates, engages
in, or in any way furthers any act of cruelty to any animal, or any act
tending to produce such cruelty, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
6 The exception clause reads, in part, as follows: "Nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prohibit or interfere with any properly conducted scientific
tests, experiments or investigations, involving the use of live animals, performed or
conducted in laboratories or institutions, which are approved for these purposes by
the state commissioner of health." Id. Animal experimentation, whether for
scientific research into diseases or to test new products intended for humans, is
viewed by many animal rights activists as a form of cruelty. This is usually either
because the testing facility keeps the animals in small cages indoors and subjects
them to painful experiments without anesthetics or because improved technology
makes the continuation of animal experimentation unnecessary. Proof of the
consumer demand for an end to animal testing can be seen in some widely
distributed cosmetic and beauty products that display labels asserting that the
product and/or ingredients were never tested on animals. With increased consumer
awareness, some companies are also choosing to disclose that their products do not
contain any animal by-products, which are used in a wide range of products, such as
many nail polish removers. Groups such as People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals publish lists of companies that continue to test their products on animals
and lists of ingredients that are derived from animals so that consumers can make
informed decisions about products they choose to purchase.
6 See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 351 (prohibiting the fighting of animals),
§ 355 (prohibiting the abandonment of animals), § 356 (prohibiting the failure to
provide adequate food and drink to animals that have been impounded), § 359
(prohibiting the carrying of animals in a cruel manner), § 359-a (governing the
proper transportation of horses), § 361 (addressing the interference with or injury to
domestic animals), § 362 (governing the depositing of substances dangerous to
animals when in a public place), § 365 (governing the clipping or cutting of dogs'
ears), § 368 (prohibiting the unlawful operation upon the tails of horses) (McKinney
1991).
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In People v. Bunt,7 the existing law withstood an attack
upon its constitutionality on due process grounds. In this case of
first impression, the defendant moved for a declaratory judgment
that section 353 was unconstitutional for vagueness and
therefore denied him the constitutional requirement of notice of
the prohibited conduct.8 The defendant, Bunt, was accused of
beating a dog with a baseball bat.9 Bunt was not provoked nor
did act in self-defense when he beat the dog to the point where
the animal was no longer able to move.10
After a review of other jurisdictions' treatment of similarly
worded statutes, the court held that the statute was
constitutional." The court noted that while other states'
statutes were imprecisely drafted, their purpose remained clear:
to punish those who treated animals cruelly.12 The average
person understands the meaning of the word "cruelty," the court
observed, and even if the statute itself was unclear, it became
clear when read together with the pertinent definitions. 13 The
court held that for conduct to fall within the statute's definition
of "cruelty," it must be "unjustified" as determined by the trier of
fact.14 The defendant's argument that the statute "prohibits
virtually any and all human conduct towards animals" did not
persuade the court. 15 The court in Bunt used a common sense
approach in construing the statute by not allowing grammatical
7 462 N.Y.S.2d 142 (J. Ct. 1983).
8 See id. at 142.
9 See id. at 142-43.
10 The charge was based on an eyewitness whose deposition, quoted in the
opinion of the court, stated that Bunt "raised the bat above his head and hit Spunky
[the dog] in the back .... Defendant continued hitting Spunky with the bat ....
Even after Spunky was lying on the ground not moving, Bruce (the defendant)
repeatedly hit him in the head and body with the baseball bat." Id. at 143 (internal
quotations omitted).
11 See id. at 146. The court considered the judicial treatment of similar statutes
in Oklahoma and Indiana. See id. at 144.
12 See id. at 144-45. Speaking about Oklahomas interpretation of its statute,
the court in Bunt observed: "In sustaining the statute the court noted that while the
statute is loosely drawn, nevertheless it reveals its main purpose to punish those
who are cruel to animals." Id. at 144.
13 See id. The court noted that "the New York statute defines in Agriculture
and Markets Law [§1 350(2) that 'torture' or 'cruelty' includes every act, omission, or
neglect whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering or death is caused or
permitted." Id.
14 Id. at 145.
15 Id. at 143.
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imperfections to work contrary to the purpose of the rule, as the
defendant's position had advocated.16
The application of section 353 was challenged recently in
People v. Voelker.17 This case implicated the defendant's First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.18 Eric Voelker
videotaped the decapitation of three live iguanas in his Brooklyn
apartment and had his acts televised on a program aptly titled
"Sick and Wrong."19 Voelker challenged the application of
section 353 because his acts of cruelty had only been discovered
when they were televised.20  The defendant argued that
application of section 353 in this situation qualified as a content-
based restriction on his right to free speech and was therefore
unconstitutional. 21  The court agreed that content-based
restrictions were unconstitutional, but refused to recognize this
particular statute as an effort to restrict the content of otherwise
free speech. The statute is, instead, exactly what it says: "a
restriction against torturing, injuring, maiming, mutilating or
killing animals."22  It does not contemplate modes of
communication, and even if it serves to "prohibit the torturing of
an animal as a form of expression, such a statute would not be
unconstitutional where it serves a legitimate governmental
interest."23 The court in Voelker noted that the Supreme Court
has recognized the protection of animals as a legitimate
governmental interest, even in a context affecting religious
practices. 24  The court pointed out the absurdity of the
16 "'[Tlhe words control the punctuation marks, and not the punctuation marks
the words.... Punctuation in writings, therefore, may sometimes shed light upon
the meaning of the parties, but it must never be allowed to overturn what seems the
plain meaning of the whole document.' " Id. at 145 (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Pomerantz, 207 N.Y.S. 81, 87 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1924)).
17 658 N.Y.S.2d 180 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1997).
18 See id. at 181.
19 Id.
20 See id. at 184. The defendant argued that his televised acts, that were




23 Id. (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991)).
24 See Voelker, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 184 (stating that "the U.S. Supreme Court has
indicated that a neutral anti-cruelty statute which is limited to the government's
legitimate interest in the prevention of cruelty to animals may be upheld despite its
effect on religious observance") (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993)).
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defendant's assertion, which by its rationale would allow
criminals of all stripes to escape the law by televising
their crimes.25
The defendant in Voelker also argued that the accusatory
instrument was insufficient because the district attorney did not
set forth the basis for the assertion that the acts were done
without justification, as required by the statute.26 To make out a
prima facie showing under the statute, the court said that the
district attorney need only allege facts that establish the
defendant unjustifiably injured, maimed, or killed the animals.2 7
The court held that decapitation did injure, maim, or kill.28
Furthermore, the court was not satisfied with the defendant's
argument that because he cooked and ate the iguanas, his
conduct was justified.29 The Voelker court then relied on the
Bunt decision to conclude that the allegations regarding the
unjustifiable nature of the defendant's conduct were suitably left
as an issue for the trier of fact.30 The court said that if the
defendant's conduct had resulted in temporary, unavoidable acts
unaccompanied by criminal intent, and were necessary to
preserve the safety of the property involved, or to prevent danger
or injury to such property, then such acts could be considered
justifiable rather than torture.31 Since the defendant had not
asserted a justification on such grounds, his motion to dismiss
was denied.32
25 See Voelker, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 184 ("A defendant cannot shelter himself from
prosecution by the mere televising of a criminal act.... Such an argument defies
common sense and cannot be sustained.").
26 See id. at 181.
27 See id. at 183.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 182. Legal slaughtering of animals for food is allowed by license
from the commissioner of the New York State Department of Agriculture and
Markets. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MErS. LAW § 96-b (McKinney 1991); cf. N.Y. AGRIC. &
MTTS. LAW § 96-c (a) (McKinney 1991) (exempting farmers who butcher their own
animals for use by their household); AGRIC. & MITS. LAW § 96-d (McKinney 1991)
(labeling the slaughter of animals in an unlicensed establishment as unlawful);
AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 96-z-9 (McKinney 1991) (defining criminal slaughter as a
class E felony).
30 See Voelker, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (citing People v. Bunt, 462 N.Y.S.2d 142 (J.
Ct. 1983)).
31 See id.
32 See id. at 183-84.
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I. NEW LEGISLATIVE ACTION
In the first substantial addition to section 353 in over three
decades, the Legislature has added subsection (a), creating a
felony for aggravated cruelty to animals. The new subsection
reads in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of aggravated cruelty to animals when, with
no justifiable purpose, he or she intentionally kills or
intentionally causes serious physical injury to a companion
animal with aggravated cruelty. For purposes of this section,
"aggravated cruelty" shall mean conduct which: (i) is intended
to cause extreme physical pain; or (ii) is done or carried out in
an especially depraved or sadistic manner.33
The class of infractions that warrant the felony status of
section 353-a are limited in two significant ways from those
which receive misdemeanor status under the original section
353. Section 353-a protects a limited class of animals and seeks
to define conduct that qualifies as aggravated cruelty. First, the
class of animals protected under section 353-a is limited to the
protection of "companion animals," while section 353 covers all
animals.34 The definition of "companion animal" was added and
includes "any dog, or cat... [and] any other domesticated
animal normally maintained in or near the household of the
owner."35 This definition includes strays, which are frequently
the targets of violence.36 It is not clear whether the iguanas in
Voelker would qualify as a "companion animal."37
3 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1999); see also
William Glaberson, Legal Pioneers Seek to Raise Lowly Status of Animals, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1999, at Al (noting that in 1994, 44 states had animal cruelty
misdemeanors, and to date, 27 states have upgraded to felonies).
34 Compare N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1999)
(applying to a "companion animal"), with N.Y. AGRIC. & MTS. LAW § 353
(McKinney 1991) (applying to "any animal, whether wild or tame").
35 1999 N.Y. LAWS 118, § 2 (amending N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 350(5)
(McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1999) (emphasis added)). Farm animals are specifically
excluded from the definition of companion animals. See id.
36 See id.; see also Senator Roy M. Goodman's Sponsor Memorandum
accompanying S. 5166A, 222nd Legis. Sess. (1999) (noting that § 353-a includes
specific protection of stray dogs and cats because they frequently fall victim to
"heinous acts of cruelty") [hereinafter Goodman's Sponsor Memorandum].
37 The status of iguanas would depend on whether they are considered
domesticated. This raises interesting issues concerning whether animals such as
iguanas, snakes, or turtles that live in cages, inside a house, apartment, or garage
qualify as domesticated animals. Is "domesticated" for certain animals synonymous
with not living in the wild?
292 [74:287
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Additionally, the Legislature outlined the conduct necessary
to support a felony conviction. Section 353-a requires that the
injury to the "companion animal" be serious or result in death.38
The defendant must also have intended to cause extreme pain or
have acted in a depraved or sadistic manner.3 9 Section 353
merely requires that the injury be unjustified or done with
willful cruelty, but does not call for an evaluation of the nature of
the defendant's behavior.40 If exhibited today, the conduct of the
defendants in Voelker and Bunt would likely justify prosecution
under section 353-a.41 It appears that many of the cases of
animal cruelty previously prosecuted under section 353 will also
fit within section 353-a, allowing prosecutorial discretion in
choosing whether to seek a felony conviction against a
particular defendant.
Throughout the legislative process, section 353-a was cited
as a tool to prosecute the most abhorrent acts of animal cruelty
and as a deterrent against this conduct in the future. The
sponsor of the legislation in the Senate, Roy M. Goodman,
elaborated in his supporting memorandum accompanying the
bill that, "[gliven the growing public recognition of the rights of
animals to be treated in a humane fashion, this bill seeks to
38 See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1999).
39 See id.
40 See id. § 353.
41 The defendant's actions in Voelker would almost certainly satisfy the
aggravated cruelty element of § 353-a. Similarly, in Bunt, the defendant's conduct
would also rise to the level of aggravated cruelty. Bunt's motivation for attacking
Spunky, the dog, was to deter the dog from approaching his female dog that was in
heat. See People v. Bunt, 462 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (J. Ct. 1983). A witness, however,
recounted that Bunt continued to beat Spunky even after the dog stopped moving
and ceased to be a threat. See id. Bunt's conduct could be viewed as an attempt to
cause "extreme physical pain" to the dog or characterized as "especially depraved or
sadistic," thereby satisfying the aggravated cruelty element of § 353-a. See N.Y.
AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1999).
In 1998, Thomas Capriola was charged with animal cruelty when he was
discovered producing animal mutilation videos that portray women wearing high
heels stepping on and mutilating or killing small animals, including mice and frogs.
Mr. Capriola was charged with a misdemeanor offense. See Edward Wong, Long
Island Case Sheds Light on Animal-Mutilation Videos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2000, at
B4. Today, Mr. Capriola would likely be charged under the New York felony statute.
Because he was selling these videos, he could also be prosecuted under a new
federal law that makes the creation or distribution of " 'a depiction of animal
cruelty' for 'commercial gain,'" an offense punishable by up to five years in prison.
See id. It is interesting to note that this arrest resulted from a call from Mr.
Capriola's girlfriend to the Suffolk County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals. See id.
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ensure that these cases not be handled as petty matters by
increasing the most flagrant acts to a felony."42 In the approval
memorandum filed by the Governor upon signing this new
amendment, which was referred to as "Buster's Law" for a cat
that had been doused with kerosene and burned, he stated that
"[bjy providing felony treatment for aggravated cruelty to
animals, the bill not only adequately punishes those who prey on
defenseless animals, but also sends a clear message that such
cowardly and despicable acts of violence will not be tolerated."4 3
The second law recently passed by the legislature concerning
the treatment of animals bans canned shoots or hunts.44 Canned
hunting is the practice of paying a fee to kill, either by gun, bow
and arrow, or spear, an animal that has been tied down, hobbled,
staked, caged, boxed, or penned inside a fenced area.45 The
animals normally involved in this "sport" are big-game animals
that have been raised in captivity or imported from
other continents. 46
Ranches in New York, and elsewhere, that offer canned
hunts are lucrative businesses.47 While existing laws protected
"threatened," "endangered," and wild animals, the new
42 Goodman's Sponsor Memorandum, supra note 36. See generally Glaberson,
supra note 33, at A18 (noting that 27 states now make cruelty to animals a felony);
Victoria Rivkin, Animal Law Practitioners Seek Justice, Not Dollars, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
18, 1999, at 1 (noting that the continued existence of cruelty to animals has made
animal rights law a growing field).
43 Governor George E. Pataki's Approval Memorandum 3, A. 8338-A signed as
Chapter 118, 222nd Legis. Sess. (June 28, 1999) [hereinafter Pataki's Approval
Memorandum].
4 See 1999 N.Y. LAWS 208 (codified as N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-1904
(McKinney 1997 & Supp. 1999)). New York is one of several states to ban canned
hunting. See generally Debra West, Ranch Hunting: One Person's Sport, Another's
Slaughter, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1999, at B1 (noting that New Jersey and
Connecticut have banned canned hunting along with several other states).
45 See 1999 N.Y. LAWS 209 (codified as N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-1904
(McKinney 1997 & Supp. 1999)). The sponsor of the bill in the assembly noted that
the goal of canned shooting is to assure a "trophy [for] a person who [has] paid a
fee." Assemblyman Stringer's Sponsor Memorandum accompanying A. 1738-A,
222nd Legis. Sess. (1999) [hereinafter Stringer's Sponsor Memorandum]; see also
West, supra note 44, at B6 (citing a member of the Humane Society who "attributes
the growth in ranch hunting to a quest for stuffed animal trophies that hunters like
to display").
46 See generally West, supra note 44, at B1.
47 See id. at B6 (estimating that the market in Texas for ranch hunting in
Texas is a $100 million per year industry). At one ranch in New York, where there
are approximately 200 "hunters" per year, the prices range from $500 to $8000 per
animal with lodging fees of almost $150 per night. See id.
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legislation was designed to close the gaps and protect other
animals.48 As such, the act prohibits the canned shooting of
"non-native big game mammals," which includes big game
mammals that have been imported from other countries and
mammals native to North America that have been raised in
captivity.49 An exception is made for farm animals or animals
subjected to approved testing.50 The prohibition of canned shoots
is applicable only to ranches of less than ten contiguous acres.51
The law also provides two alternative penalties for ranchers
convicted of hosting canned shoots. One option is to charge the
ranch owner with a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to
$2,500, or a jail term of up to one year, or both.52 The court is
given an alternative option of levying a larger fine if the
defendant has gained money or property through the commission
of the crime.53 This is likely to be the case in canned shoots
where the ranch owner is paid a fee by the 'hunter," usually
corresponding to a predetermined worth of the animal killed.54
This alternative penalty allows the court to require the payment
of an amount that does not exceed twice the value of the
defendant's gain from the canned shoot, with a cap of five
thousand dollars.55
48 See Stringer's Sponsor Memorandum, supra note 45.
49 1999 N.Y. LAWS 208 (codified as N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-1904
(McKinney 1997 & Supp. 1999)); see also Stringer's Sponsor Memorandum, supra
note 45; West, supra note 44 (identifying animals that have been hunted on canned
shooting ranches).
50 See 1999 N.Y. LAWS 208 (codified as N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAw § 11-
1904(2)(a-c) (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 1999)) (providing that the law will not
prohibit the taking, hunting, or trapping of animals if provided by New York State
law or regulation, the slaughtering of animals allowed by New York Agriculture and
Markets Law or by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the killing of a
dangerous animal, which is likely to injure or kill someone); see also Stringer's
Sponsor Memorandum, supra note 45.
51 See 1999 N.Y. LAWS 208 (codified as N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-
1904(1)(a)(3-4) (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 1999)).
52 See 1999 N.Y. LAWS 208, § 4, amending N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-
0921 (adding § 71-0921(13)).
53 See id.; see also id. at § 1, amending N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.05(5) (McKinney
1998).
54 See West, supra note 44, at B6 (identifying the range of predetermined fees
for certain animals); see also Stringer's Sponsor Memorandum, supra note 45.
55 See 1999 N.Y. LAwS 208, § 1, amending N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.05(5).
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II. THE HIDDEN PITFALLS OF THE NEW LAWS
While these two new laws purport to recognize the innate
rights of animals and to provide greater protection for animals in
New York, the benefits provided by these amendments are
limited to the peripheral results of the expected enforcement of
the laws. This is illustrated by the goals behind the creation of a
felony for aggravated cruelty to animals under section 353-a,
which are far removed from any recognition of innate animal
rights. Additionally, the prohibition of canned shooting is so
diluted that it will do little more than take up space
in McKinney's.
A clue that the true ire of the Legislature was not directed
toward the immediate curbing of intentionally cruel acts inflicted
on helpless animals is provided by Senator Roy M. Goodman, the
sponsor of the Senate bill. After referring to the different types
of abuses inflicted on animals, Senator Goodman shifted focus
away from the rights of animals and notes the association of
animal abuse with violence against people.56 While there may
not be any evidence that the Senator's district has a
disproportionate number of violent criminals, there has recently
been a large amount of attention paid to extensively publicized
school shootings. These recent events may have provided the
impetus for the bill's passage. By the time the bill was passed by
the full Senate, the Majority Leader, Senator Joseph Bruno,
barely made reference to the violent acts animals are subjected
to in the press release announcing the bill's passage.57 Instead,
his press release reiterated a statement by Senator Goodman
about serial killers and added the assertion that "[m]ost of the
children involved in the recent spate of school murders have a
background of torturing and killing animals."58 Senator Bruno
noted that prosecution under this statute would identify "deviant
behavior," while Senator Goodman described the bill as a way of
56 See Goodman's Sponsor Memorandum, supra note 36 ("The connection
between animal abusers and violence towards humans shows that virtually every
serial killer had a history of abusing animals before turning their attention
to people.").
57 See Senator Joseph Bruno, Senate Passes Bill to Combat Animal Cruelty,
New York State Senate Press Release (June 14, 1999).
58 Id.
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dealing with "disturbed individuals who abuse animals before
they commit more serious crimes."59
In describing the importance of the bill he was signing, the
Governor's approval memorandum echoed the Senate's concerns
by stating that "gruesome acts [of torture endured by animals],
coupled with recent studies that reveal a correlation between
violence against animals and future acts of violence against
humans, underscore the need to enhance penalties for
animal cruelty."60
The need for stricter animal cruelty laws to prevent a
possible future murderer is not a novel idea. The histories of
some of this country's most infamous serial killers and the abuse
of animals in their backgrounds have been discussed in
numerous articles.61  Perhaps the most recent frequently
analyzed case has been that of serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer.62
r9 Id. The belief that crimes against humans are always more serious than
those committed against animals, while a widely held belief, is not the only view.
Practitioners of animal law are trying to change the way the legal system views
animals as property. See Glaberson, supra note 33, at Al (noting that animal rights
lawyers are "filing novel lawsuits and producing new legal scholarship to try to chip
away at the fimdamental principle of American law that animals are property and
have no rights"). One commentator, a former Supreme Court clerk and current
professor of animal law at Rutgers University, has urged animal rights lawyers to
be more aggressive. See id. at A18. Professor Francione suggested that animal
rights lawyers "file suit on behalf of gorillas, asserting that 'they should be declared
to be 'persons' under the Constitution,' with constitutional rights." Id. The Animal
Legal Defense Fund, an organization of lawyers working for animal rights, has a
staff attorney developing novel approaches to establishing legal rights for animals,
including the use of legal precedents relied on to emancipate people from slavery.
See id. at A18.
60 Pataki's Approval Memorandum, supra note 43. The governor mentions the
recent studies but interestingly made no mention of the recent school shootings,
which have raised a lot of questions regarding prediction of violent behavior toward
humans and of signs exhibited by the shooters prior to their acts. See Charlotte A.
Lacroix, DVM, JD, Another Weapon for Combating Family Violence: Prevention of
Animal Abuse, 4 ANIMAL L. 1, 8-9 (1998) (discussing studies which show a
correlation between animal cruelty and other criminal behavior).
61 See Lacroix, supra note 60, at 8-9 (noting that serial killers and mass
murderers including Albert Desalvo, also known as the "Boston Strangler," Ted
Bundy, and Jeffrey Dahmer, all had past histories of animal abuse); A. William
Ritter, Jr., The Cycle of Violence Often Begins with Violence Toward Animals, 30
PROSECUTOR 31 (JanIFeb., 1996). Ritter, a prosecutor, noted that many infamous
serial killers abused animals in their youth and that this trait is so common that
the FBI has included it in its profile of serial killers. See id. at 32; see also Dahmer
May Have Impaled Animals as Teen: Animal Cruelty Common Trait of Serial
Killers, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 8, 1991, available in 1991 WL 8885515
(recounting how neighbors of serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer found cats, frogs, and the
head of a dog impaled or staked to trees); Michael Killian, Cruelty to Animals: Just
297
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Hopefully, animals will see some actual protection under
this legislation. Indeed, some prosecutors are more apt to take a
potential felony prosecution more seriously than they would a
petty misdemeanor charge.63 These cases often have a great deal
of press value as human interest stories and should therefore
add to prosecutorial motivation to provide additional resources
for their investigation of animal cruelty cases.64 As elected
officials, prosecutors have a special interest in cases that will be
covered by the evening news.
Much like section 353-a, the canned shoot legislation under
section 11-1904 also fails to recognize the existence of any
fundamental rights for animals and, therefore, fails to provide
adequate protection. As an issue not specific to New York, there
has also been a movement at the national level to prohibit
canned shooting. For several years, Congress has introduced
legislation in both houses to ban canned shoots. 65 Past versions
of this legislation have failed to pass and the versions currently
in Congress have not been the subject of substantial action, due
in part to opposition from a strong lobby against any such
regulation.66 The federal regulation would, if enacted, be focused
the Beginning, DET. NEWS, Sept. 3, 1991, available in 1991 WL 4661651. Killian, a
former police officer and animal cruelty investigator, noted the connection between
animal abuse and violence toward humans and warned that society "cannot afford
to take crimes against animals lightly." Id.
62 See Killian, supra note 61. The newspaper articles from 1991 detailing the
accounts of Jeffery Dahmer's history of abusing animals as a child
are multitudinous.
63 See Steve Ann Chambers, Animal Cruelty Legislation: The Pasado Law and
Its Legacy, 2 ANIMAL L. 193, 195 (1996) (explaining that prosecutors in Washington
were more willing to prosecute animal cruelty cases after the legislature passed a
law which made certain types of animal abuse a felony); Joshua Marquis, The
Kittles Case and Its Aftermath, 2 ANIMAL L. 197, 199-201 (1996) (explaining that
the legislatibn which makes animal abuse a felony helps encourage prosecutors to
prosecute animal cruelty cases).
64 See Marquis, supra note 63, at 201 ("A prosecutor has to know whether he is
going to receive community support and not just ridicule for... [prosecuting animal
cruelty] cases.").
65 The Captive Exotic Animal Protection Act of 1999 was introduced in the
106th Congress. See S. 1345, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1202, 106th Cong. (1999).
66 On the day of its introduction, the Senate bill was referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary. The House version of the bill was referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary and then to the Subcommittee on Crime. Neither bill has been reported to
the floor for action by either body. See id.; see also West, supra note 44, at B6
(quoting the senior vice president of the Humane Society of the United States,
Wayne Pacelle, who predicted that this version of the legislation will likely not pass
because of the powerful Texas lobby where ranch hunting is a $100 million dollar a
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on the impact of interstate and international trade in exotic
animals that can sometimes result in the unlawful trade of
endangered or threatened species.67
The impact of the legislation under Chapter 208, which bans
"canned shoots," is miniscule because it only applies to owners,
operators, and managers of ranches that are ten acres or less.68
Statements from supporters and opponents of this legislation all
seem to indicate that no one knows for sure the number or size of
canned hunting ranches that exist in New York State.69 Up to
this point, these ranches have gone unregulated and information
regarding their number or size is lacking.
The legislation that passed under Chapter 208 was an
altered version of that which had originally been proposed by an
year business); Nancy Perry, The Fruits of Our Labor: Results from the First Session
of the 105th Congress-1997 Federal Legislative Summary, 4 ANIMAL L. 137, 141
(1998) (noting that the Captive Exotic Animal Protection Act did not pass during
the first session of the 105th Congress); Lisa Weisberg, Content: Third Annual
Conference on Animals and the Law, 15 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 515, 523 (1998)
(indicating that while there is strong public support for legislation such as the
Captive Exotic Animal Protection Act, this type of legislation is not enacted or is
watered down due to the influence of the "powerful and financially resourceful
hunting and trapping lobby, and the conservation agencies that are greatly
influenced by them"); Jamie Elizabeth Wrage, Taking Aim at Canned Hunts
Without Catching Game Ranches in the Crossfire, 30 LOY. LA. L. REV. 893 (1997)
(discussing canned hunting regulation at the federal and state levels).
67 See generally Robert J. Shaw, Note, Nabbing the Gourmet Club: Utilizing
RICO Enforcement and Punitive Provisions to Curb the International Trade of
Endangered Species, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 283, 286-90 (1998) (discussing various
federal endangered species protection measures). Cf. News Channel 4: Unfair Game
(NBC television broadcast, Nov. 4-5, 1999) (investigating the trail of "surplus" exotic
animals from the Six Flags Wild Safari in Jackson, N.J. through an animal dealer
in North Carolina to hunting ranches in Pennsylvania and Texas). In one segment,
Alan Green, co-author of Animal Underworld: Inside America's Black Market for
Rare and Exotic Species (Public Affairs 1999), was interviewed and discussed how
tame and exotic animals from zoos and animal parks often end up at hunting
preserves. See News Channel 4: Unfair Game (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 5,
1999).
68 See 1999 N.Y. LAWS 208, § 2 (adding § 11-1904).
69 See Bill Would Ban Hunting Big Game on Little Plots, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1999, at B10 ("Officials at the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, which drafted the legislation, are uncertain whether there are any
hunting ranches in New York State on properties small enough to be affected by
this bill."); 'Canned Hunts' to be Restricted Under New Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
1999, at B5 (quoting a Department of Environmental Conservation spokeswoman
who conceded that canned hunts are infrequent); West, supra note 44, at B6
("Officials at the ASPCA and Humane Society estimate that there are four or five
big-game hunting ranches in New York, but there is no way to know for sure.").
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animal rights group.70  The state agency responsible for
enforcement of Chapter 208, the Department of Environmental
Conservation, and the American Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), an animal rights group that had
supported the bill, both doubt that it would regulate any existing
ranch because of the acreage limitation.71 The addition of the
acreage limitation represents a concession to these special
interest groups and insures that any existing ranch over ten
acres in size will not be subjected to the statute's penalties.72
The penalty options available under Chapter 208 further
complicate the effectiveness of the legislation. Many of the fees
charged by the ranchers for kills of specific animals available on
their ranches are so large that even the strictest application of
the penalty under the statute would not outprice the fee paid by
the customer.73 Rancher would have little to fear in an economic
sense from the enforcement of this statute. Only the possibility
of a jail sentence of up to two years might visit true hardship on
the owners or managers of these ranches.
CONCLUSION
While the step up from a misdemeanor to a felony in the
fight against animal cruelty is a change few would disagree with,
70 See Bill Would Ban Hunting Big Game on Little Plots, supra note 69, at B10
(quoting an ASPCA official who stated that "[t]he opposition [to Chapter 208] was
tremendous"); see also West, supra note 44, at B6 (noting that in the six years since
its introduction in New York, pressure from the National Rifle Association, property
rights and sportsmen lobbies have left it less restrictive than the original version).
71 See Bill Would Ban Hunting Big Game on Little Plots, supra note 69, at B10
(noting that the ASPCA does not know whether any of the ranches in New York are
less than ten acres and hence will be regulated); 'Canned Hunts' to be Restricted
Under New Law, supra note 69, at B5 (quoting a Department of Environmental
Conservation spokeswoman who did not know of any ranches that would be
regulated under the new law); see also Rivkin, supra note 42, at 4 (noting that
Elinor Molbegott, former general counsel for the ASPCA, assisted in drafting the
new law).
72 See 'Canned Hunts' to be Restricted Under New Law, supra note 69, at B5
("State Assembly Sponsor of the new law, Scott Stringer, a Manhattan Democrat,
said the 10-acre limit was added to make the bill acceptable to the Republican
Senate [and further noted] 'The only way we were going to pass this was to make
some accommodation.' ").
73 See West, supra note 44, at B6 (noting that prices for taking a deer can range
from $500 to $8,000); see also News Channel 4: Unfair Game (NBC television
broadcast, Nov. 4, 1999). In an interview, Faye Leydig from the Glen Savage
Hunting Ranch in Fairhope, PA, said that animals can go for $10,000, and that
when hunters "draw blood, they buy." Id.
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the discretion prosecutors exercise could potentially allow this
new tool to be used exclusively against young people who may
harbor proclivities toward harming people. There are also many
that agree prosecutors should have the availability of a serious
charge, so that those people demonstrating the warning signs of
"typical" killers can be locked up before their behaviors escalate.
In the current climate, however, where it seems as though there
is an epidemic of school violence, prosecutorial zeal may become
an issue. There is no age limit to those who are abusing
animals. Older people might well escape prosecution under the
felony charge if the focus of the law remains as narrow as the
reasons for which it was enacted. That result would be a great
disservice to animals and the New Yorkers who care about them.
While the initial thought to ban canned hunting completely
would have been a boon to animal rights groups, legitimate
hunters, and customs officials alike, the present state of affairs
seems to be anti-competition regulation for the current market of
ranches. In New York, proponents of animal rights will have to
keep up the fight for a true legal recognition of animals' inherent
rights, a victory which must come another day.
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